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Summary

While policymakers have talked a lot recently about finding a comprehensive fix for escalating health care
costs, such as Medicare-for-all, many economists have been exploring the possibility that the answer for
excessive health care spending may rest instead in series of smaller adjustments. This issue brief presents
research on one such small fix: preferred pharmacy networks. This is a relatively new tool whereby health
insurers aim to steer consumers to lower cost “preferred” pharmacies, where insurers are able to negotiate
lower drug prices. The research concludes that preferred pharmacy contracting results in a roughly 1 percent
decrease in Medicare Part D drug costs among plans utilizing this tool—a fact that should be encouraging to
policymakers concerned about reigning in costs, especially in light of other research demonstrating that health
care consumers do not shop around for lower priced care. If this practice of “steering” consumers toward lower
cost drugs were applied to the entire pharmaceutical industry, the savings could be much greater.
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Health care spending in the U.S. reached $3.5 trillion—$10,739 per person—
in 2017, or nearly one-fifth of GDP.1 The high cost of health care has been a
staple campaign issue for several presidential cycles, and 2020 is shaping up to
be no exception.
According to a recent Washington Post article, most
of the current Democratic candidates for President
now support Medicare-for-all or some form of public
option to expand health care coverage.2 These are the
types of big ideas that policymakers often embrace in
the face of problems as large and seemingly intractable
as improving health care affordability and expanding insurance coverage. However, as research on the
behavior of health care providers, insurers, and consumers has demonstrated time and again, the devil
may be in the details.
Yale economist Fiona Scott Morton noted in a
New York Times article last summer that the “big”
fix to excessive health care spending may, in fact, be a
series of much smaller fixes.3 As Scott Morton said, “I
think focusing on the forest misses the fact that there
are trees encroaching out of the forest. And we need
to start cutting them down.” Throughout the various industries that support the American health care
system, opportunities for such savings abound. For
example, in Scott Morton’s recent work on “surprise”
out-of-network billing for emergency care, an arbitration policy remedy reduced out-of-network billing by

SUMMARY
• While policymakers have talked a lot recently about finding a comprehensive fix for escalating health care costs, such as Medicarefor-all, many economists have been exploring the possibility that
the answer for excessive health care spending may rest instead in
series of smaller adjustments.
• This issue brief presents research on one such small fix: preferred
pharmacy networks. This is a relatively new tool whereby health
insurers aim to steer consumers to lower cost “preferred” pharmacies,
where insurers are able to negotiate lower drug prices.
• The research concludes that preferred pharmacy contracting results
in a roughly 1 percent decrease in Medicare Part D drug costs
among plans utilizing this tool—a fact that should be encouraging
to policymakers concerned about reigning in costs, especially in
light of other research demonstrating that health care consumers
do not shop around for lower priced care.
• If this practice of “steering” consumers toward lower cost drugs
were applied to the entire pharmaceutical industry, the savings
could be much greater.
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34 percent and lowered in-network
emergency physician payments by
9 percent.4 In a similar vein, Einav,
Finkelstein, and Mahoney (2018)
studied the incentives of long-term
care hospitals (LTCH) in the Medicare program and found that restructuring Medicare contracts could
generate savings of about 5% of total
payments to LTCHs.5 Dafny, Ody,
and Schmitt (2017) found that the use
of copay coupons for branded prescription drugs increased drug spending by $700 million to $2.7 billion
during 2007 and 2010.6 The policy
fixes suggested by these results would
have limited effects on overall health
care spending in the U.S., but a few
million (or billion) dollars of reduced
waste here or increased savings there
can begin to add up.
In my own research, I have discovered another example of “1%” savings
—and perhaps something even more
valuable, as I explain in this Issue
Brief. In joint work with Amanda
Starc, an economist at Northwestern, I examined selective pharmacy
contracting, which is a relatively new
practice used by health insurers to
lower the drug prices that their private
insurance plans pay to pharmacies.7
We find that when insurance plan
enrollees’ out-of-pocket prices are

transparent—in this case, the prices
are copays charged to Medicare Part
D plan enrollees—health care consumers can sometimes be steered to
lower cost “preferred” pharmacies.
On the other hand, these preferred
pharmacy networks reduce the
comprehensiveness of enrollees’ drug
plans, which is a very real welfare loss
for consumers. Ultimately, given the
steering we observe in practice, and
given the price differentials observed
between preferred and non-preferred
plans, we find that preferred pharmacy
contracting results in a roughly 1
percent decrease in Medicare Part D
drug costs among plans utilizing this
tool.

MEDICARE PART D TARGETS
PHARMACIES’ MARKET
POWER
The rising cost of drugs in the
United States is the focus of much
attention from economists, patient
advocates, and policymakers.8 While
much of this attention is directed
toward pharmaceutical manufacturers,
research has found that pharmacies
are able to realize significant margins
when they have the power to foreclose
access to certain products.9 Pharmacy
companies are quite concentrated

and often do have significant market
power, with five companies commanding over 60 percent of prescription
revenues.10
Preferred pharmacy networks are
a relatively new tool for combatting
pharmacy market power, analogous to
plans’ historical use of drug formularies to combat manufacturers’ market
power. Researchers have argued that
the introduction of Medicare Part D
in 2003 lowered the price of drugs
by increasing insurer market power
(through the use of formularies) relative to that of drug manufacturers.11
That market power shift, along with
a turn toward generic drugs, has led
to program costs lower than forecasted when this government benefit
was passed into law. This is not to say
that Part D insurers (or, more accurately, the pharmacy benefit managers
(PBMs) serving as insurers’ imperfect
proxies) act as perfect agents of enrollees, but rather that they are incentivized to reduce drug costs. Indeed,
drug prices in Part D plans increased
only about 2 percent between 2007
and 2010, although plan premiums
grew by 62.8 percent.12
Medicare Part D stipulates that
prescription drug coverage be provided to elderly Americans by private
health insurers. Enrollees are able to
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choose from dozens of plans offered
in their local geographic markets, and
nearly 41 million of the 57 million
people on Medicare (71 percent) were
enrolled in a Part D plan in 2016.13
Though offered by private insurers,
Part D is a government benefit and
is strictly regulated by the federal
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS). CMS mandates coverage generosity of plans in terms of
actuarial value, types of drugs covered,
and pharmacy network breadth.14
The pharmacy networks designed
by plans in the Medicare Part D
program may exclude independent
pharmacies or entire pharmacy chains,
such that enrollees are not able to use
plan coverage for prescription fills
at those pharmacies. However, Part
D plans are limited in their ability
to entirely exclude pharmacies due
to network adequacy standards.15
Another lever available to plans is
that a pharmacy can be designated
as preferred or non-preferred in a
plan’s network, where preferred status
implies reduced out-of-pocket costs to
enrollees. Critically, network adequacy
standards do not apply to the preferred network, so preferred pharmacy
networks can be much more restrictive
than plans’ overall networks. This distinction prompted CMS to investigate

Part D preferred network coverage
in 2015. The investigation by CMS
found that plans’ overall networks
met or exceeded the statutory access
standard, but one in ten preferred
networks offered sufficient preferred
pharmacy access to fewer than 40
percent of urban beneficiaries in their
plans’ service areas.16
Both plans and pharmacies face
important trade-offs in their negotiations over prices and network status.
From the pharmacies’ perspective,
plans may steer additional consumer
demand to a specific pharmacy or
pharmacy chain in exchange for
retail price discounts. From the plans’
perspective, restrictive networks allow
plans to steer consumers to lower cost
pharmacies, and the threat of exclusion could lead to a lower negotiated
price at a given pharmacy. However, if
consumers have strong preferences for
broad networks, narrower networks
will reduce enrollment. These mechanisms rely on consumer demand being
responsive to differential copays, and
this may not be true if a large subset
of consumers is insulated from cost
sharing. It is this set of trade-offs that
we quantified in our research.

STEERING (SOMETIMES)
WORKS, BUT CONSUMERS

PREFER TO PAY FOR CHOICE
Medicare Part D presents perhaps
a best-case scenario for analyzing the
welfare trade-offs inherent in selective
contracting. In the health economics literature, numerous studies have
found that health care consumers do
not “shop.”17 However, prescription
drug needs are more predictable than,
say, the need for inpatient hospital
care, and frequent, repeated interaction with retail pharmacies implies
that enrollees are likely aware at the
plan choice stage of the relative convenience and cost of nearby pharmacies.
While only 13 percent of sample
plans used preferred pharmacy networks in 2011, this rose to 70 percent in 2014. The copay differentials
between preferred and non-preferred
pharmacies ranged from $6-$8 per
30-day supply for the most popular
plan formulary tiers, indicating that
the incentive to use preferred pharmacies within preferred-network plans
was substantial. However, these copay
differentials did not generally apply
for low-income subsidy (LIS) enrollees, who account for about 20 percent
of plan spending in our sample. For
example, for many LIS enrollees, the
maximum copay was $2.55 per 30-day
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with 95 percent coverage. The majority of Part D enrollees
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equivalent or “enhanced” plans with non-standard deductibles and tiered copays, so that cost-sharing varies across
drugs and pharmacies.
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supply for a generic drug in 2014.
Both preferred and non-preferred
pharmacy copays generally exceed
this maximum, effectively removing
the copay differential and, in turn, the
incentive to visit preferred pharmacies.
Utilizing data on prescription
drug events, plan demand, pharmacy
demand, plan characteristics, and
pricing from CMS, we observed every
prescription fill for the years 20112014 for a random 10 percent sample
of all Medicare eligible individuals.
Our results cover both branded and
generic drugs, and in some cases focus
particular attention on the market for
generic prescription drugs because,
strikingly, there is significant price
dispersion even within extremely
narrowly defined products and even
within generic drugs. (Evidence of
substantial generic price variation suggests that the issue of market power
in generics be revisited, even though
generic drug prices typically receive
little research or policy attention.18)
Our research into preferred pharmacy networks reveals three key takeaways. First, preferred network status
has a large positive effect on pharmacy
demand, which is largest for nonLIS enrollees and for relatively low
cost enrollees. Specifically, preferred
pharmacies receive eight percent

greater market share among non-LIS
enrollees (16 percent overall) due to
preferred status alone. In contrast, LIS
enrollees and very high-cost enrollees
are less responsive to preferred status.
Subsidies for LIS enrollees are crucial
for safeguarding their access to health
care products and services, but it is
useful for policymakers to understand
the trade-offs involved—even if only
for forecasting purposes—when LIS
and non-LIS enrollees are pooled in
the same plans.
Second, plans face additional
trade-offs when setting the comprehensiveness of their networks. Plans
with more comprehensive preferred
networks receive greater enrollment,
all else equal, and the average enrollee
is willing to pay an additional $82
annually for a unit increase in network
comprehensiveness (approximately a
standard deviation).
Third, due to subsidies and costsharing structures that limit enrollees’
exposure to preferred pharmacy copay
differentials, the increased costs from
a plan (hypothetically) transitioning to fully comprehensive preferred
networks would be relatively small.
On balance, the results imply that
preferred network contracting saved
plans $9 per enrollee-year (1 percent annual savings for the average
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enrollee-year) between 2012-2014.
This works out to approximately $150
million in increased costs if preferred
network plans were to become fully
comprehensive. Notably, these modest
cost increases would be smaller than
the consumer welfare benefits associated with moving to comprehensive
preferred networks ($16 per enrolleeyear), given enrollees’ revealed preference to pay ex ante for network
coverage.
Our findings raise the question
of why insurers offer limited network
plans at all, when the cost savings are
significantly less than the value of
expanded access. Three features of this
market could explain the discrepancy.
First, although preferred network
plans do not attract enrollees who
take fewer drugs, our results indicate
that the enrollees in plans with more
restrictive networks purchased cheaper
drugs. Plans could therefore be using
network breadth as a screening tool
to attract healthy enrollees. Second,
limited pharmacy network plans
are a relatively recent phenomenon.
Thus, insurers may be experimenting, and the market may not have
been in equilibrium during the period
we studied.19 Finally—and of most
interest to policymakers concerned
about public health care spend-
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ing—the threat of exclusion from a
preferred network may allow insurers
to negotiate larger discounts within a
pharmacy. Indeed, our analyses suggest that drug cost savings associated
with selective contracting are driven
in part by restrictive plans steering
enrollees to lower cost pharmacies and
in part by restrictive plans extracting
larger discounts from pharmacies. In
future work, we will explore this issue
further.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The fact that we discovered any
ability to steer consumers in their
health care purchases is surprising.
Selective pharmacy contracting in
Medicare Part D plans is undoubtedly a niche topic. But the reality
that steering in a health care context
sometimes works in practice should be
encouraging to policymakers interested in reining in health care costs,
particularly the drug prices paid by
Medicare enrollees.
If this steering result were to be
applied to the entire $333 billion
pharmaceutical drug industry,20 the
savings could be much greater. Small
fix or not, this targeted attempt by
Medicare Part D insurance companies
to lower prescription drug prices is yet
another example for policymakers of
how trimming health care costs wherever possible might be an essential
part of any “big” solution.
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